

Poland
in the System of European Differentiated Integration

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attitudes
towards DI

attitudes towards
European
unification

attitudes towards salient
integration-related issues
(e.g. migration, green
transition, monetary union)

ideational / normative standpoints /
preferences (e.g. cultural,
economic,...?)

(DIFFERENTIATED)
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

postfunctionalism

CITIZENS

PARTIES

ATTITUDES

POSITIONING


cleavage theory

DEMAND

SUPPLY



Cleavage Theory by Lipset/Rokkan



Critical junctures for the Establishment of 20th century party systems:

- National Revolution
- Industrial Revolution

Historical lines of cleavages by Lipset/Rokkan (1967: 10-15) and Rokkan (1980: 121)

post – Lipset-Rokkanean cleavage concepts


- ⊗ Ronald Inglehart (1990) – materialism vs post-materialism
- ⊗ Grande and Kriesi (2012), Bornschieer (2010)
- ⊗ “As countries modernize, cognitive skills and cultural resources become more important for an individual's place in society”. In consequence, it stands to reason that in the wake of societal denationalization **a new profile of political parties developed along the two dimensions. The green and, with different degrees, the (neo-)liberal parties** are regarded as ideal-typical representatives of cosmopolitanism and hence of European integration. Western European social democratic parties and most Christian democratic parties have also increasingly turned to the cosmopolitan pole in the wake of social changes. In response, the voters and the established parties being critical towards economic but especially cultural change took a turn to the communitarian branch, including the traditional left, **right-wing populist and transformed conservative parties.**”
- ⊗ Michael Zürn (2016) and Wolfgang Merkel (2017) - *winners vs. losers of globalization.*

Postfunctionalism: Integration vs. Demarcation

„The perforation of national states by immigration, integration, and trade may signify a critical juncture in the political development of Europe no less decisive for parties and party systems than the previous junctures that Lipset and Rokkan (1967) detect in their classic article”.

(Hooghe/Marks 2017: 1)

GAL / TAN emerging cleavages




attitudes towards
"multi-speed" DI

attitudes towards
"multi-menu" DI

attitudes towards
"multi-tier" DI

ATTITUDES TOWARDS
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION



GAL - TAN neo-cleavages

attitudes towards
migration

attitudes towards
green transition

attitudes towards
minorities

How do (new) cleavages structures shape attitudes and positions towards enhanced European unification?

How do these cleavages manifest themselves in the European context?;

How are they linked to the citizens' attitudes towards European (differentiated) integration?;

How are these cleavages mirrored in party positions and therefore party systems?;

What can we learn from the citizens' attitudes and party positions about the ideational foundations of (differentiated) European integration?;

How do the cumulative and overlapping crises correspond with the evolution of the mentioned attitudes and positions?

Research Design

Country Selection:

POL (fear of EI deepening + fear of marginalization),

GER (need for deeper integration + staying at the fore-front)

Supply Side: Weighted Multidimensional Scaling of Party Positions

→ *CHESDATA Expert survey on Party Positions ('04-'19)*

Demand Side: Multiple Regression Analysis of representative Survey data


→ *European Social Survey (ESS) ('04-'20)*

Time frames


| Critical Event | Demand Side: ESS Data | Supply Side: CHES Data | |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------|
| | | GER | POL |
| | 2004 | 2006 | 2006 |
| Constitutional | | | |
| | 2008 | | |
| Euro | | 2010 | |
| | 2012 | | |
| Ukraine I | 2014 | 2014 | |
| Schengen, Brexit | | | |
| | 2018 | | |
| | | 2019 | |
| (Covid-19) Ukraine II | 2020 to 2022 | | |

Supply Side

POL 2004




Supply Side



Supply Side

POL 2019



Demand Side

B37 CARD 14 Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification¹⁷ should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?

Unification
has already
gone too far

Unification
should go
further (Refusal)

(Don't
know)

00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 77 88

European Social Survey 2004-2020

Demand Side - POL

| | POL 2004 | | | POL 2008 | | | POL 2012 | | | POL 2014 | | | POL 2018 | | |
|------------------------|-------------------|-----------|-------|-------------------|-----------|-------|-------------------|-----------|-------|-------------------|-----------|-------|-------------------|-----------|-------|
| | Coef. | Std. Err. | P> t | Coef. | Std. Err. | P> t | Coef. | Std. Err. | P> t | Coef. | Std. Err. | P> t | Coef. | Std. Err. | P> t |
| EU attitude | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| fear migr eco | -0.0788472 | .040951 | 0.054 | -0.1783353 | .0455663 | 0.000 | -0.1121207 | .0406129 | 0.006 | -0.1194425 | .0381406 | 0.002 | | | |
| fear migr cult | -0.1376885 | .0429204 | 0.001 | | | | -0.1051433 | .0434771 | 0.016 | -0.1485424 | .0400729 | 0.000 | -0.1800521 | .0440484 | 0.000 |
| Anti gay rights | -0.2315695 | .0619621 | 0.000 | -0.1939422 | .0702634 | 0.006 | | | | -0.2647974 | .0652148 | 0.000 | -0.2491087 | .0728381 | 0.001 |
| Satisf. w/ dem | 0.1332579 | .0348282 | 0.000 | 0.1504407 | .0361226 | 0.000 | 0.3345493 | .0337243 | 0.000 | 0.1156829 | .0335034 | 0.001 | -0.0851401 | .0343824 | 0.013 |
| strong gov. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Red. Inc. Dif. | | | | | | | | | | -0.254114 | .0770199 | 0.001 | -0.1800146 | .0813107 | 0.027 |
| Comfort inc. | | | | | | | | | | 0.3010034 | .1410463 | 0.033 | 0.3795179 | .1489784 | 0.011 |
| environ | | | | | | | | | | .2207517 | .0954078 | 0.021 | | | |
| non vote | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| urban | -0.1173719 | .060294 | 0.052 | | | | | | | -0.1881075 | .0683466 | 0.006 | | | |
| education | | | | | | | | | | -0.0961113 | .048547 | 0.048 | -0.1280757 | .0493854 | 0.010 |
| sector | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| R2 | 0.0841 | | | 0.0897 | | | 0.1383 | | | 0.1366 | | | 0.1092 | | |
| N | 1,086 | | | 1,084 | | | 1,275 | | | 1,029 | | | 938 | | |

CONCLUSIONs

- ⊕ Transnational cleavage of integration vs. demarcation among parties and votes *across* EU
- ⊕ Socio-structural determinants diminish
- ⊕ Socio-cultural factors increase as reliable determinants for attitudes towards EI and therefore strong drivers for EU (Dis)integration, differentiation



THANK YOU
for your attention

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